- On July 28, 2026, the President of the Republic of Poland presented acts of appointment to 211 judicial assessors of the district courts and 18 assessors of the voivodeship administrative courts. The acts do not bear the countersignature of the Prime Minister – in accordance with the judgment of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal of June 25, 2026 (K 2/26), which found the requirement of such a countersignature to be unconstitutional. The Tribunal’s judgment is final.
- That same day, the Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the presidents of the courts of appeal – according to which the persons appointed by the President are still “examined trainees of the National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution (KSSiP),” and not assessors – calling for them not to be allowed to adjudicate.
- On July 29, 2026, the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) – the body whose constitutional task is to safeguard the independence of the courts – adopted a resolution in which it endorsed the government’s narrative of an obligation of countersignature.
- The Prime Minister, who now demands a countersignature, had previously refused for a very long time to grant one, contrary to the appeals of, among others, Poland’s Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman).
- Court presidents who do not allow the assessors to adjudicate could face disciplinary and criminal liability, and the State Treasury could face compensation claims on the part of the assessors.
On July 28, 2026, a ceremony was held at the Presidential Palace in Warsaw at which acts of appointment to the position of judicial assessor – in Poland, a junior judge who performs the duties of a judge – were presented. Appointments went to 211 assessors of the district courts and 18 assessors of the voivodeship administrative courts – mostly graduates of Poland’s National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution (KSSiP), of whom nearly 70% of this year’s graduates had, owing to protracted procedures, so far remained without work and without means of subsistence.
Unfortunately, instead of closing the matter, the ceremony became the opening of yet another installment of a constitutional dispute whose victims include not only the independence of the justice system but also the purely personal situation of the assessors. That very same day, the Ministry of Justice informed the presidents of the courts of appeal that the assessors appointed by the President are not assessors until the Prime Minister places his signature (the so-called countersignature) under their acts of appointment. A day later, the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) joined the ministry’s position. It is the body which, under Article 186(1) of the Polish Constitution, safeguards the independence of the courts and of judges, and its composition was renewed earlier this year by the current parliamentary majority.
The Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling in case K 2/26 as the basis for the President’s actions
On June 25, 2026, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the requirement of the Prime Minister’s countersignature for the validity of the President’s acts concerning, among other things, the appointment of judicial assessors and assessors of the voivodeship administrative courts is inconsistent with the Constitution and with the principle of the continuity and efficient operation of public institutions, which follows from the Preamble in conjunction with Article 2 of the Constitution.
The Tribunal’s position rests on the controversial concept of “derivative prerogatives.” While this concept had previously been expressly called into question by the Tribunal – notably in its judgment of March 23, 2006 in case K 4/06 – a certain difference between the two rulings should nevertheless be underscored. The reflections on derivative prerogatives were set out in the 2006 judgment on the occasion of finding unconstitutional a statutory provision granting the President of the Republic the power to appoint the Chairman of the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT). Importantly, however, in that situation the Tribunal found it impermissible both for the President to exercise that power without a countersignature – since it fell outside the catalog set out in Article 144(3) of the Constitution – and, perhaps even more so, to exercise it with a countersignature, since that would limit the independence of the National Broadcasting Council.
In the dispute resolved in case K 2/26, by contrast, the dilemma was not whether the President may appoint assessors at all – that has remained rather beyond dispute for the past ten years – but whether he should do so with or without the Prime Minister’s countersignature.
There is essentially only one argument for the countersignature – a strict linguistic interpretation of Article 144(3), which, like the Constitution in general, makes no mention of assessors. But is this a decisive argument?
If we return to the 2006 judgment, the position expressed there – that the countersignature requirement contributes to limiting the independence of the body concerned – can fully be applied here as well. Meanwhile, under Article 106j § 1 of the Polish Law on the System of Common Courts:
A judicial assessor shall, in the exercise of his office, be independent and subject only to the Constitution and statutes.
What is more – the essence of the assessor’s function is that, under Article 106i § 8 of that law:
A judicial assessor shall perform the duties of a judge for a period of 4 years from the date of taking up the assessor’s position.
In other words – assessors do, admittedly within a certain limited scope, the very same thing as judges: they administer justice.
The Tribunal expressly pointed to the consequences that follow from this in its judgment of October 24, 2007 (SK 7/06), in which it found the then Article 135 § 1 of the Law on the System of Common Courts inconsistent with Article 45(1) of the Constitution (the right to a fair trial). The inconsistency stemmed from the discretionary character of the entrustment of judicial duties, the lack of irremovability, and the omission of the National Council of the Judiciary from the nomination process, which constituted a breach in the constitutional procedure for conferring judicial power.
Accordingly, the removal of yet another discrepancy between the process of appointing full judges and the procedure for appointing assessors – which is what a countersignature requirement in the latter case would amount to – fits squarely within the line of argument of the 2007 judgment.
The argument that the appointment of assessors is not listed in Article 144(3) of the Constitution must be considered weak, for the reason that at the time the Constitution was adopted it was not the President who appointed them but the Minister of Justice – in keeping, incidentally, with the history of this institution, which dates back to the interwar Second Polish Republic. The transfer of this power to the President should therefore be regarded as consistent with the spirit of both the 2006 and the 2007 judgments of the Tribunal.
All the more so given that, in its judgment of June 5, 2012 in case K 18/09, the Tribunal held that the singling out of the President’s power to appoint judges in the catalog of his prerogatives is:
not so much a strengthening of the President’s autonomous constitutional position as an accentuation of the judiciary’s independence from the government and the bodies subordinate to it.
It was emphasized in this context that:
a countersignature requirement would mean granting the Prime Minister a right of veto over the candidates proposed by the NCJ.
It is therefore difficult to identify reasons why such a “veto” of the Prime Minister should be permissible with respect to the appointment of assessors, who – in essence – perform the same function as judges.
The Tribunal drew explicit attention to this context in judgment K 2/26, pointing out that:
The President – as a body elected in a general election yet functionally unattached to any of the branches of power – plays, vis-à-vis the judiciary, the role of guarantor of its independence, and not that of an entity representing the executive branch in the strict sense. From this perspective, granting the Prime Minister, as a body answerable to the Sejm [the lower house of Poland’s parliament], the instrument of countersignature with respect to presidential acts shaping the staffing and leadership of the courts would mean granting the government influence in a sphere from which the framers of the Constitution deliberately and consistently eliminated such influence. The mechanism of the countersignature – which in other areas serves the function of transferring political responsibility for an act of the head of state to the Prime Minister – loses its justification where the President’s act serves to ensure the independent and uninterrupted functioning of the judicial branch.
Thus, all of the judgments cited above together form a coherent line of case law, in light of which the applicable model for appointing assessors should be as close as possible to the procedure for appointing judges. The Tribunal therefore had to cut the creation of adjudicators off from the influence of the executive, because only such a solution meets the standard set in that line of case law. Requiring the Prime Minister’s countersignature would amount to an attempt to bring the executive back into this procedure.
The context of ruling K 2/26 – the Prime Minister’s inaction
In arguing its position in judgment K 2/26, the Tribunal also pointed to practical considerations:
making the effectiveness of the acts of the President of the Republic of Poland dependent on a countersignature, the granting of which is not limited by any deadline or statutory conditions, may in practice transform this mechanism into a means of blocking the staffing and functioning of the organs of the judicial branch, without any legal accountability.
This is by no means a purely abstract reservation; it refers, unfortunately, to the actual practice of Prime Minister Donald Tusk in the recent past. It is best documented by the replies of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister to the interventions of the Ombudsman (case VII.603.4.2025). Between May 13 and 25, 2025, the National Council of the Judiciary adopted resolutions presenting the President with motions for the appointment of graduates of the 13th class of judicial training. The Presidential Chancellery forwarded four draft decisions covering 171 future assessors to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister for countersignature on July 7 and 10, 2025. As the Head of the Presidential Chancellery, Małgorzata Paprocka, wrote:
To date, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister has not returned the draft acts of appointment forwarded to it. Nor is there any information justifying the length of the wait for the countersigning of the decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland concerning assessors, particularly in view of the enormous shortages of adjudicating staff in the common courts.
Throughout this period, the graduates had been left, since May, without means of subsistence and without health insurance, forced – as they reported to the Ombudsman:
to register with county employment offices, to sign up for insurance coverage through their spouses at the latter’s places of work, to live off modest savings, or to take out loans.
Even the Polish Judges’ Association “Iustitia,” which is notably in favor of the current governing coalition and fiercely opposed the previous one, spoke up on the matter, appealing on July 25, 2025 to the President and the Prime Minister for the process to be sped up immediately:
Maintaining this state of affairs violates their dignity and undermines the material foundations of their existence and that of their families. Young, hard-working, and well-educated lawyers are also unable to put to use the skills acquired in the course of their judicial training (…)
The Iustitia association pointed out that this was particularly important in view of the growing staff shortages in the justice system. It is worth noting: back then, a year age, Iustitia was appealing for urgent appointments, citing the good of the justice system, whereas today (as discussed in more detail below) the National Council of the Judiciary, shaped largely with that association’s participation, declares those appointments ineffective.
The pressure partly worked: the Prime Minister granted his countersignature on July 25 and 28, 2025, and on July 31, 2025, the President presented acts of appointment to 171 assessors in the common courts. The assessors of the administrative courts, however, were treated entirely differently. To this day, those assessors have not received a countersignature, and in the following months their group grew to eighteen.
The Presidential Chancellery also stated plainly at the time what the constitutional problem consists in:
The institution of the countersignature, as the Prime Minister’s assumption of parliamentary responsibility for an act of the President of the Republic of Poland, is in no way equivalent to granting any member of the Council of Ministers, including the Minister of Justice, a right of substantive supervision over acts of the President of the Republic such as the acts of appointment of assessors in the administrative courts.
The then Ombudsman, Marcin Wiącek, intervened in the matter once again, addressing the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister on August 5, 2025 (ref. VII.603.5.2025) and pointing out that the delay was harming not only the candidates but also the citizens awaiting the resolution of their cases, and that the prevailing state of uncertainty raised doubts from the standpoint of the right of equal access to public service (Article 60 of the Constitution).
However, in the reply of the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Jan Grabiec, of October 2, 2025 (ref. BPRM.413.6.19.2025), it was declared – on the basis of the Sejm’s resolution of December 20, 2023 on remedying the effects of the constitutional crisis in the context of the constitutional position and functions of the National Council of the Judiciary in a democratic state under the rule of law (M.P. of 2023, item 1457) and Resolution No. 162 of the Council of Ministers of December 18, 2024 on counteracting the negative effects of the constitutional crisis in the area of the judiciary (M.P., item 1068) – that granting a countersignature is not an obligation of the Prime Minister.
It must be stressed, however, that neither a resolution of the Sejm nor a resolution of the Council of Ministers is a source of universally binding law – the catalog of such sources is set out in Article 87 of the Constitution, and it comprises exclusively the Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements, and regulations. The Prime Minister was thus refusing to perform a constitutional obligation by invoking acts which, in the hierarchy of the sources of law, carry no normative weight whatsoever. Under Article 7 of the Constitution, public authorities act on the basis of and within the limits of the law – not on the basis of resolutions of a purely political character.
The most important element of the reply of the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, however, was the admission that, as the government understands it, the countersignature is an instrument of indefinite, unmotivated veto:
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland does not provide for situations in which the granting of a countersignature would be an obligation of the Prime Minister, nor does it set a specific deadline for making such a decision.
What is more – this position has to some extent (though for now not finally) been sanctioned by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw which, in response to a precedent-setting complaint against the Prime Minister’s inaction, lodged by a person who had won a competition for an assessor’s position at the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Gliwice but could not see the nomination procedure completed owing to the absence of a countersignature, rejected the complaint by decision of June 24, 2026 (ref. VI SAB/Wa 45/26), endorsing the argument of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister itself, according to which neither the act of appointment, nor the countersignature, nor its absence is subject to review by the administrative courts.
The government has thereby turned the countersignature requirement into an instrument of hard, utterly unassailable veto, in the face of which an assessor is left entirely at the Prime Minister’s mercy – and it is the Prime Minister who fought in court to secure that defenselessness.
As a side note, though not without significance, it may be added that the mechanism of delay revealed by the Presidential Chancellery in its above-mentioned letter to the Ombudsman of July 17, 2025 consisted in the Prime Minister’s Office waiting for an opinion from the Government Legislation Center, which in turn was waiting for an opinion from the Minister of Justice – a body that has no competence whatsoever to opine on the selection of staff in the administrative courts. That same Minister of Justice, as we discuss in more detail below, is today writing to the presidents of the courts of appeal, seeking to decide who is and who is not an assessor.
In light of this entire context, it is all the less surprising that Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, in judgment K 2/26, found precisely such a hard veto of the Prime Minister to be inconsistent with the Polish Constitution and with the principle of the continuity of the operation of public institutions.
The Justice Ministry declares that an appointed assessor is an “examined trainee” – contrary to the express wording of the law
Although the government has not published judgment K 2/26 – just as it has not published any ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal issued after December 2024 – this, in light of the Tribunal’s judgment in case P 3/25, cannot affect the effectiveness of its operative part. It is therefore no surprise that, as we wrote at the outset of this article, on July 28, 2026, the President of the Republic appointed nearly 230 assessors.
The ministry’s reaction was immediate. By letter of July 28, 2026 (ref. DKO-IV.5006.29.2026), the Department of Personnel and Organization of the Common and Military Courts of the Ministry of Justice informed the presidents of the courts of appeal that, in view of the failure to present the acts of appointment to the Prime Minister for countersignature, the appointees are still:
examined trainees of the KSSiP.
The ministry, in a surge of unexpected concern for the social rights of the assessors (whom it does not recognize), suggested with considerable audacity that they:
may be subject to compulsory health insurance and retain the right to benefits arising from having obtained the status of an unemployed person.
In other words – the Ministry of Justice is suggesting that persons to whom the President of the Republic has presented acts of appointment to a judicial office, satisfying the requirements of Article 106i § 4 of the Law on the System of Common Courts, register with the unemployment office.
In parallel, the Justice Ministry launched a logistical operation – letters were sent to the district courts instructing them to collect the originals of the acts of appointment from the newly appointed assessors:
in view of the obligation to present these documents to the Prime Minister.
– documents which are to be carted away from the district courts by the drivers of the regional courts by July 30. If this actually happens, the picture will undoubtedly take on symbolic features: the documents confirming the assumption of an office within the independent judicial branch will be collected and delivered to the Prime Minister’s Chancellery.
Yet the law says something entirely different. Under the already-cited Article 106i § 4 of the Law on the System of Common Courts:
the service relationship of a judicial assessor shall be established upon delivery to him of the act of appointment.
The legislature made the durability of that relationship conditional solely on the assessor reporting – within 14 days – to the court indicated in the act of appointment (Article 106i § 5); only the ineffective expiry of that deadline causes the appointment to lapse. What is more, under Article 106i § 6 of that law, that circumstance is established by… the Minister of Justice – which prompts concern about the possibility of continued government influence on the assessors’ situation. Since the acts of appointment were delivered on July 28, 2026, the service relationship has therefore been established by operation of law – without the need for any further action by the executive.
This was firmly pointed out by the Board of the VOTUM Association of Graduates and Trainees of the KSSiP, in its position statement of July 28, 2026:
The question of who is a judicial assessor and who is entitled to administer justice cannot be decided by the executive branch. […] Neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of Justice has the competence to decide whether a person to whom an act of appointment has been delivered is a judicial assessor, or to decide on allowing that person to adjudicate.
The Association rightly adds that the organs of administrative supervision, including court presidents, are likewise devoid of any such competence, since under Article 9b of the Law on the System of Common Courts, acts of administrative supervision may not encroach upon the domain in which judges and judicial assessors are independent. A refusal to allow an appointed assessor to adjudicate is therefore not an exercise of supervision – it is a patent abuse. Nor can it be assumed that an appointment becomes effective only once the assessor reports to his place of service, because – as VOTUM notes:
the system of labor law knows no such concept as “suspended” employment.
The NCJ, which is supposed to safeguard the independence of the courts, calls for making them dependent on the Prime Minister’s decisions
However, on July 29, 2026, the National Council of the Judiciary adopted a resolution recognizing the necessity of countersigning the assessors’ acts of appointment. The conclusion of that resolution reads as follows:
The National Council of the Judiciary considers that the granting of a countersignature will determine the effectiveness of these acts of appointment.
We are thus faced with an absurd situation. The body whose sole constitutional task is to safeguard the independence of the courts and the independence of judges is officially calling for the effectiveness of the assumption of a judicial office to depend on the signature of the head of government. The Council invokes, in doing so, citizens’ right to a fair trial – that is, the very value in whose name the Constitutional Tribunal, in case SK 7/06, dismantled the model of an assessorship dependent on the executive. The argument thus turns against the very thesis it is meant to support: it is precisely the right to a fair trial that requires that neither a minister nor the prime minister decide who adjudicates.
What is more, in the sentence just before that conclusion of the same resolution, the Council stresses that:
the effectiveness of the acts of appointment to the positions of judicial assessors cannot be open to doubt, both in the context of the realization of citizens’ right to a fair trial and of the rights of the persons concerned by these acts of appointment.
– only to state, in the very next sentence, that the appointment is ineffective.
One can – indeed one must – state clearly that this is not a position in defense of the assessors, nor of the independence of the justice system; it is a position in defense of the Prime Minister.
The newly appointed assessors harbor no illusions on this score, as one of them said outright, not hiding his disappointment:
This is a new Council; a large part of the NCJ’s 15 judge-members were at last designated by judges. It was supposed to stand guard over the rule of law and the independence of judges – and of assessors as well – yet it is hard to escape the impression that this resolution is part of a larger plan, and one in line with the wishes of the Minister of Justice.
It is worth recalling that VOTUM’s appeal to the Council was formulated in exactly the opposite terms: the Association pointed out that standing up in defense of the assessors:
is not a matter of the Council’s discretion, but belongs to its fundamental, constitutional duties.
– and that failing to do so would mean:
an evasion of the duty for which the National Council of the Judiciary was established.
To that appeal, the NCJ responded… by siding with the government. This is, incidentally, not the first time that this very body, which is supposed to protect the independence of the courts, has acted in concert with the Minister of Justice – as was the case earlier with, for instance, its support for the suspension of a judge from his official duties.
Since the NCJ has decided not to carry out its constitutional tasks, it fell to the Supreme Court, in the person of its First President, Zbigniew Kapiński, to remind it of them: on July 30, 2026, he issued a statement concerning the resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary.
He stated plainly in it that:
This position [the NCJ’s resolution] cannot be reconciled either with the provisions in force or with the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of June 25, 2026, ref. K 2/26.
The First President of the Supreme Court emphasized that:
Assessors, too, administer justice; they issue rulings in the name of the Republic of Poland and must permanently remain free from any influence of the executive branch.
He also charged the NCJ with inconsistency – after all, the Chairman of the NCJ took part in the ceremony of July 28 and, as the First President of the Supreme Court recalls, presented the assessors with judicial chains purchased with the Council’s own funds:
One cannot, on the one hand, take part in the solemn presentation of the acts of appointment and publicly affirm their significance while, on the other, questioning the legal effects that the law expressly attaches to their presentation.
The statement also identifies the specific threats to the assessors’ situation arising from the NCJ’s position, which:
In an extreme case, may even permanently prevent them from taking up their positions.
– for:
It is not difficult to imagine that the Council’s position could be used as a pretext for finding that an assessor has not taken up his position within the statutory deadline, even despite his readiness to begin service.
What is more, the resolution may expose the assessors to:
unwarranted questioning of their status and stigmatization by the parties to the proceedings in which they will adjudicate.
Finally, in the closing sentence, the First President took a very clear position, indicating that:
The National Council of the Judiciary itself should […] come to the defense of these persons. It should not, instead, be advocating a solution that strengthens the position of the Prime Minister, who represents the parliamentary majority that elected the Council’s current composition.
– thereby clearly showing how full of hypocrisy are the attempts to differentiate the status of the current Council, allegedly independent, from that of its two predecessors – even though all of them were elected in exactly the same procedure and on the basis of the same provisions.
If the Prime Minister has “revoked” a countersignature once, what will stop him from revoking more?
The First President also observed that accepting the countersignature requirement:
in the context of the not-so-distant attempt to “withdraw a countersignature,” would also open up room for attempts to remove assessors from service.
This is an obvious allusion to the precedent created by Donald Tusk himself, when he declared in 2024 that he:
had made the decision to revoke the countersignature
– which he had granted under the decision of the President of the Republic of Poland No. 1131.18.2024 of August 17, 2024 on the designation of the chairman of the assembly of judges of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. Yet the Constitution knows no institution of the revocation of a countersignature – a countersignature is a constitutional act of a political character, not an administrative decision or a declaration of intent within the meaning of civil law, and so it cannot be “withdrawn” or invalidated on grounds of error. Initially, the Prime Minister himself in fact admitted as much – before changing his mind under political pressure.
If, then, the Prime Minister has once considered himself entitled to withdraw a signature already given, once that signature became politically inconvenient, one might ask, somewhat provocatively, whether he would not be inclined to do the same with respect to the 229 assessors. Assessors who handed over the originals of their acts of appointment would then find themselves in an unenviable position: without their documents, with a signature that can be “revoked,” and without recourse to the courts, since that avenue, as recounted above, has for now (though not yet finally) been closed off by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw. That is the situation to which accepting that the effectiveness of the assumption of a judicial office depends on the will of the head of government would lead.
Conclusion
It must therefore be stated once again: in light of the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment in case K 2/26, the legal position is unambiguous. The acts of appointment delivered on July 28, 2026 produced the effect provided for in Article 106i § 4 of the Law on the System of Common Courts – that is, they established the assessors’ service relationships; the assessors may now (and should) report within 14 days in order to take up their positions, after which they should be allowed to adjudicate without delay.
If anyone attempts to prevent them from doing so, that decision will entail concrete consequences.
Court presidents who do not allow the assessors to adjudicate commit a dereliction of duty. This will expose them to disciplinary liability under Article 107 § 1(1) of the Law on the System of Common Courts – for an obvious and gross violation of the law – as well as to criminal liability under Article 231 § 1 of the Criminal Code, that is, for abuse of powers or dereliction of duty by a public official to the detriment of the public or private interest. As employers, they will also be obliged to pay remuneration – if not for work performed, then for readiness to perform work where its performance is prevented for reasons attributable to the employer (Article 81 § 1 of the Labor Code).
The Minister of Justice, who by official letter purports to decide the status of persons appointed by the President of the Republic and in fact directs the actions of court presidents, is acting without any legal basis, and thus in breach of Article 7 of the Constitution. This opens the way both to criminal liability under Article 231 § 1 of the Criminal Code and to constitutional liability before the State Tribunal for a violation of the Constitution in connection with the office held (Article 198(1) of the Constitution). The same remark applies to the Prime Minister, should he wish to grant a countersignature – contrary to the Tribunal’s judgment.
In sum – embracing the countersignature requirement, however arguable on the basis of the literal wording of Article 144(3) of the Constitution, would require:
- ignoring the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment in case K 2/26, which would constitute a violation of Article 190(1) of the Constitution,
- rejecting the line of case law expressed in the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgments K 4/06, SK 7/06, and K 18/09, which came out clearly against the prime minister’s ability to influence (by means of the countersignature) the composition of independent bodies, above all in the justice system, and in favor of granting assessors the most far-reaching independence from the government, modeled on the guarantees enjoyed by judges,
- accepting abuses such as the Prime Minister’s inaction in granting countersignatures – which actually took place – or the potentially possible revocation of a countersignature.
There are, then, simply more arguments against the countersignature, and they are more convincing. Its necessity could be contemplated only if either the prime minister were obliged in every instance to grant it at the President’s request, or if his refusal to grant it meant the automatic resignation of the head of government. At present, however, the provisions of Article 144 of the Constitution are applied in neither of these two ways.
The dispute over the requirement of a countersignature for the assessors’ acts of appointment is thus a dispute over whether the question of who administers justice in Poland is decided by a procedure analogous to that laid down in the Constitution for judges – or by the signature of the head of government. The National Council of the Judiciary has opted for the latter – and it is hard to imagine a more telling negation of the task for which the Council was established.
Source of illustration: iStock.



