Poland’s Ruling Coalition Moves to Purge the National Council of the Judiciary of Opposition-Appointed Members

  • At its first sitting, the new composition of Poland’s National Council of the Judiciary adopted a resolution questioning the constitutionality of the previous composition, even though that composition was elected in an identical manner.
  • Judge Łukasz Piebiak, who protested against the resolution, was then made subject to an order of the Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, interrupting his official duties, despite the statutory conditions of such order not having beeng met.
  • The NCJ Presidium temporarily restricted Judge Piebiak’s powers as a Council member, although the Law on the NCJ provides no basis for partially restricting a judge-member’s powers short of removal from office.
  • Suspending Judge Piebiak, one of two NCJ judge members proposed by the parliamentary opposition, from the NCJ’s work would deprive the Council of its constitutional composition, rendering all of its decisions defective.
  • The new NCJ was elected in the same manner as in 2018 and 2022 and is just as consistent with the Constitution as its predecessors.

The new composition of the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), whose 15 members were elected by the Sejm from among judges on May 15, 2026 — in exactly the same manner and on the basis of exactly the same provisions as in 2018 and 2022 — convened on June 11, 2026 for its first sitting.

From the very outset of its work, the new composition of the Council chose to begin with controversy. The first of these was its complete endorsement of the unlawful narrative advanced by the Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, regarding the supposed possibility of removing the Disciplinary Prosecutor for Judges of the Common Courts, Judge Piotr Schab, without any legal basis. This was, however, not the only action taken by the NCJ at its first sitting that raises legitimate doubts.

A political NCJ resolution

The next such action was Resolution No. 579 of the National Council of the Judiciary of June 11, 2026 on rebuilding citizens’ trust in the administration of justice and strengthening the independence of courts and the independence of judges. This resolution did not constitute any substantive determination of matters falling within the competence of the NCJ, but was in essence a political declaration in which the NCJ fully endorsed the narrative of the current government — which certainly calls into question actual independence of the new NCJ.

Already in the second sentence of the resolution there has been expressed the view that:

Since 2004, Polish courts have also become European courts and Polish judges — European judges […].

Polish courts, however, are by no means “European courts”! They neither were established by the European Union, nor are they subordinate to it. They are courts of the Republic of Poland, and it is in its name, and not that of the European Union, that they pronounce judgments in accordance with Article 174 of the Constitution. Article 178(1) of the Constitution, in turn, unequivocally provides that judges:

[…] shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution and statutes.

To be sure, in light of Article 91 of the Constitution, EU law is applied by judges, but this must still take place — contrary to the CJEU’s theses — in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Constitution, under which:

The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic of Poland.

Finally, in its judgment of November 24, 2010 (case K 32/09), concerning the conformity with the Constitution of the so-called Treaty of Lisbon, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal held that the conferral of competences to the EU level may not infringe the essence of sovereignty, including that it may not entail conferring control over the administration of justice:

The principle of preserving sovereignty in the process of European integration requires that, in that process, the constitutional limits on the conferral of competences — delineated by confining such conferral to certain matters — be respected, and thus that an appropriate balance be ensured between the competences conferred and those retained, consisting in the fact that, with respect to competences making up the essence of sovereignty (including, in particular, the enactment of constitutional rules and the supervision of their observance, the administration of justice, authority over the State’s own territory, the army and the forces ensuring security and public order), the decisive powers belong to the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Poland.

Another fragment of the NCJ resolution that gives rise to legitimate objection is the following declaration:

The National Council of the Judiciary states that, in the years 2018–2026, the Council formed on the basis of the Act of December 8, 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2018, item 3) did not constitute a representation of the judicial community, and the manner of its appointment led to its politicization. Over the past eight years, the composition of the National Council of the Judiciary did not conform to the provisions of the Constitution, and the politicized manner of its selection resulted in its defective functioning. It is now necessary to restore the constitutional role of this body.

At this point it must be noted, above all, that the Polish Constitution nowhere describes the NCJ as a representation of the judicial community. Accordingly, considering whether the NCJ is or is not such a representation — even setting aside all the doubts in this regard concerning the current composition (13 of whose 15 members base their mandate on support obtained in a highly non-transparent and by no means universal, but rather informal and legally baseless procedure of so-called “judicial primaries”) — is of no significance whatsoever for whether that composition is consistent with the Constitution or not. Finally, it must be noted that the assertion that for the past eight years the composition of the NCJ did not conform to the provisions of the Constitution is entirely groundless — the Constitutional Tribunal, the only body empowered to issue assessments of this kind, held in its judgment of March 25, 2019 (ref. K 12/18) that:

Article 9a of the Act of May 12, 2011 on the National Council of the Judiciary (Journal of Laws 2019, item 84) is consistent with Article 187(1)(2) and (4) in conjunction with Article 2, Article 10(1) and Article 173, as well as with Article 186(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.

What is more, it was precisely on the basis of that same provision — Article 9a et seq. of the Law on the NCJ — that the current composition of the Council was elected, in exactly the same procedure as its predecessors in 2018 and 2022.

In the further part of the resolution, the NCJ calls for respect for the principle of the separation of powers and for ensuring the efficiency of court proceedings — while entirely disregarding how the current Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, has exerted extra-legal pressure on judges to make them resign their offices, or how, through his actions and those of his predecessor, Adam Bodnar, they have brought about the creation of over a thousand vacancies in the administration of justice.

It is therefore unsurprising that one of the two judge members of the NCJ (out of 15) elected without the support of the governing majority, Judge Łukasz Piebiak, protested against the adoption of the resolution in such a form. He described the resolution as:

[…] a social, political, ideological, or any other kind of manifesto that has no legal significance whatsoever; it is a string of truisms with which one may agree or not. From the standpoint of the Council’s constitutional role and statutory tasks, it is of no significance at all.

Perhaps it was precisely this statement, like his earlier protest against the counterfactual position concerning the appointment to the office of Disciplinary Prosecutor for Judges of the Common Courts, that led the Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, to apply measures of a decidedly repressive character against the judge.

The Minister of Justice’s order interrupting official duties

On June 15, 2026, the Minister of Justice, invoking Article 130 § 1 of the Act Law on the System of Common Courts, announced that he had taken:

[…] a decision to immediately remove Judge Łukasz Piebiak from his official duties on account of the extraordinary gravity of the charges he is suspected of having committed.

Indeed, Article 130 § 1 of the Law on the System of Common Courts provides that:

Where a judge has been detained having been caught in the act of committing an intentional offence, or where, on account of the nature of the act committed by the judge, the authority of the court or the essential interests of the service require his immediate removal from the performance of his official duties, the president of the court or the Minister of Justice may order an immediate interruption in the judge’s official duties, until a resolution is issued by the disciplinary court, for no longer than one month.

The point, however, is that the above conditions were in no way met by Judge Piebiak! Obviously, he was not caught in the act in connection with the commission of any offence. The second condition — the necessity of immediate removal on account of the authority of the court or the essential interests of the service — was likewise not met. As the Ministry itself admits, the ground for the order is the fact that two proceedings are pending against the judge — one (extremely controversial and politically motivated) concerning his alleged participation in an organized criminal group, and the other concerning the alleged forgery of a document with a view to bringing about a disadvantageous disposal of property of significant value. In neither of these cases, however, anything new has occurred recently — hence it is absurd to claim that the mere fact that they are pending should give rise to a necessity for immediate removal. Were that the case, the Minister should have issued such an order at least several years ago.

The matter was unequivocally commented on by the Legal Association “Veritas Et Ius in the Service of the Nation”:

The pretext for the decision of the Ministry of Justice is to be actions from many years ago, never assessed by the competent procedural authorities. The circumstances cited in the communiqué of the Ministry of Justice of June 15, 2026 had been known to the organs of the state for a long time; no new grounds arose that could lead to the conclusion that the good of judicial service required the taking of immediate, extraordinary measures […].

In its summary, the association expressed its conviction as to what the Minister’s actual aim and motive might have been — to prevent Judge Piebiak from exercising his mandate as a member of the NCJ. Everything, unfortunately, indicates that this supposition is correct.

The NCJ communiqué

The very day after the Minister’s order, the Presidium of the National Council of the Judiciary took a decision:

[…] to withhold from Judge Piebiak access to all documents containing legally protected personal data until the Council adopts a position.

It was stipulated that this is a temporary decision, pending the nearest plenary sitting of the NCJ, which is scheduled for June 23–24, 2026. In the meantime, the NCJ will also appoint:

[…] a team to assess the possibility of Judge Łukasz Piebiak performing his official duties within the National Council of the Judiciary in connection with the Minister of Justice’s decision to temporarily remove Judge Piebiak from his judicial duties.

Importantly, the communiqué concerning the Presidium’s decision cited no legal basis whatsoever for such a determination by the Presidium. This should come as no surprise, since no such basis simply exists.

Among the competences of the NCJ Presidium and its chairperson, set out in Articles 16 and 17 of the Law on the NCJ, there is none that would authorize any restriction of the rights and competences of NCJ members. Moreover, Article 130 § 1 of the Law on the System of Common Courts speaks only of the possibility of ordering an interruption in a judge’s official duties, and not of the question of a judge’s ability to participate in the work of the NCJ.

A member of the NCJ may be deprived of the right to participate in its work only as a result of the expiry of the mandate, and that, pursuant to Article 14(1) of the Law on the NCJ, may occur before the end of the term only in the exceptional event of:

  • death;
  • renunciation of the mandate;
  • expiry of the mandate of a deputy or senator;
  • expiry or termination of the judge’s service relationship;
  • the judge’s retirement or transfer to retired status.

Ordering an interruption in official duties is undoubtedly not the same as the expiry or termination of the judge’s service relationship.

The inadmissibility of extending the Minister’s order to the question of the ability to participate in the work of the NCJ was clearly pointed out in its press release by the association Lawyers for Poland (“Prawnicy dla Polski”), of which Judge Piebiak is a member.

It emphasized clearly that such an understanding of the provisions would mean that:

[…] the executive authority would gain an indirect mechanism for influencing the composition of a constitutional body that safeguards the independence of the courts and the independence of judges.

Meanwhile, as it expressly noted:

[…] order suspending a judge’s official duties cannot cover activities other than the official duties performed by the judge in court. In particular, it cannot concern the exercise of the mandate of a member of the National Council of the Judiciary, arising from an election by the Sejm. A role within the National Council of the Judiciary is not a judicial function within a court division; it is neither a judicial nor an administrative function within a court, but rather the exercise of a constitutional mandate within a body safeguarding the independence of the courts and the independence of judges.

A similar position was also issued by the association Judges of the Republic of Poland (“Sędziowie RP”).

It emphasized that:

[…] the ordering of an immediate interruption in a judge’s official duties on the basis of Article 130 § 1 of the Law on the System of Common Courts may take place in urgent situations, where regard for the good of the administration of justice and the authority of the court requires the immediate removal of the judge from the performance of his duties. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice, as the “justification” for its decision on the interruption in the official duties of Judge Łukasz Piebiak, points to proceedings that have been pending for many months before the Supreme Court, even though in none of them has even a non-final resolution consenting to holding the judge criminally liable been issued. This constitutes a manifest abuse of the institution of the interruption in a judge’s official duties.

It was also suggested that the terms used in the Ministry’s communiqué, such as:

[…] the mechanism of the offence

or:

[…] the forged will

— plainly violate the principle of the presumption of innocence.

The effects of the NCJ Presidium’s decision

If the NCJ, at its plenary sitting, upholds or even extends the Presidium’s decision and prevents Judge Piebiak from exercising his mandate, then it will indeed be possible to speak of:

[…] the loss of the NCJ’s constitutional composition.

This consequence was clearly emphasized by the very person concerned — Judge Łukasz Piebiak — who, in a press interview, stated that:

If it should come to pass that, at the upcoming sitting, which I intend to attend, I am deprived of the possibility of participating, then all decisions, including personnel decisions, taken at that sitting and at any other in which I am unable to take part will be defective. If they are personnel decisions resulting in appointments to judicial posts, then the President will not leave the matter without comment.

Indeed, if the NCJ takes decisions without the participation of one of its constitutional members, it is hard to imagine a better argument authorizing the President of the Republic of Poland to refuse, in the exercise of his prerogative, to grant such a NCJ’s motion for the appointment of a given person as a judge.

Such a situation evokes obvious associations with the actions of the Sejm, which, on the basis of a decision by Speaker Szymon Hołownia, and contrary to a decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, did not allow deputies Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik to exercise their mandates. The statutes adopted by the Sejm during that period of non-admittance are being consistently struck down by the Constitutional Tribunal — the last time this occurred was this week, in the judgment of June 16, 2026 in case K 18/24.

At this point, then, it must once again be recalled — for the time being, the new NCJ, elected in exactly the same manner as in 2018 and 2022, is just as consistent with the Constitution as they were, of which the NCJ itself, moreover, appears to be aware, as it continues the numbering of its sittings.

If, however, it does in fact exclude — without any legal basis — one of its members from participating in its work, then and only then will the hitherto groundless narrative about the NCJ’s loss of its constitutional identity become true.

One can only hope that, at the plenary sitting, the members of the NCJ will come to their senses and will not decide to take steps that would only deepen the rule-of-law crisis currently prevailing in Poland…

Image source: iStock.

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