- On September 22, 2026, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal held unanimously (case K 21/26) that the provisions establishing the so-called test of a judge’s independence and impartiality — in the common courts, the military courts and the Supreme Court — are incompatible with the Constitution.
- The Tribunal held that the constitutional right of access to public service covers not only the possibility of taking up an office but the real ability to exercise it. A judge deprived of the ability to adjudicate is therefore deprived of the very substance of that right.
- The test examines not independence or impartiality but the circumstances of a judge’s appointment, and so inverts the idea of recusal: what is said to undermine impartiality is not the circumstances of the case but general circumstances beyond the judge’s control. Since recusal already exists, the test is superfluous and fails the requirement of necessity under Article 31(3) of the Constitution.
- The mechanism duplicates — and in practice allows the circumvention of — the constitutional procedure for removing a judge from office, and carries a chilling effect: a judge may hesitate to rule in an “inconvenient” way for fear that the test will be used against him.
- In practice the test was applied only to judges appointed from 2018 onward, and refused as against judges whose first appointment came from the Council of State of the communist-era Polish People’s Republic. An institution conceived as a tool of compromise turned out to be a tool of political selection.
- The judgment covers every remaining provision on the test and completes the line of case law opened by the ruling of February 25, 2026 (SK 68/25), which eliminated the analogous mechanism in the administrative courts.
Background for international readers
The provisions struck down by this judgment were not a Polish invention. They were drafted under direct pressure from the European Commission.
From 2017 onward the Commission pursued a sustained campaign against the judicial reforms of Poland’s then Law and Justice government: it triggered the Article 7 procedure in December 2017, brought a series of infringement actions before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and obtained interim measures and financial penalties against Warsaw — while declining to apply comparable scrutiny to member states with similar arrangements, Spain among them, whose parliament likewise elects members of its judicial council.
When Poland’s National Recovery Plan — the Polish chapter of NextGenerationEU — was negotiated, the Commission made disbursement conditional on a set of judiciary “milestones.” One of them required that “the Polish courts can initiate verification procedures on whether a judge meets the requirements of independence stemming from the Article 19 TEU on rule of law.” That milestone is the direct origin of the mechanism at issue here: the test of a judge’s independence and impartiality, introduced by the amendment to the Law on the Supreme Court of June 9, 2022, which entered into force on July 15, 2022. The government of Mateusz Morawiecki enacted it as the price of access to the money.
However, the money did not follow. The Commission kept the funds blocked for the remainder of that government’s term and released the first payments almost immediately after Donald Tusk took office in December 2023, closing the Article 7 procedure on May 29, 2024 by reference to the new government’s stated intentions rather than to any completed reform — a pattern described as a rule of law “à la carte.” The institution Poland had been required to create then turned out, in practice, to serve a different purpose: not protecting judicial independence, but screening judges by the date of their appointment.
Details of the judgment
On September 22, 2026, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal ruled on an application by the First President of the Supreme Court concerning the examination of whether a judge meets the requirements of independence and impartiality in the light of the circumstances surrounding his appointment — the mechanism commonly known as the independence test. The case was heard under reference K 21/26 by a five-judge panel, with Deputy President of the Tribunal Bartłomiej Sochański as judge-rapporteur.
The Tribunal held that the relevant provisions of the Law on the System of Common Courts, the Law on the System of Military Courts and the Law on the Supreme Court are incompatible with Article 60 of the Constitution read in conjunction with Article 31(3), Article 2 and the provisions guaranteeing judicial independence and irremovability (Articles 178(1), 179 and 180(1)–(2)). The ruling was unanimous.
The contested provisions entered Polish law through the amendment to the Law on the Supreme Court of June 9, 2022 — an act passed amid political bargaining with the European Commission over the funds of the National Recovery Plan. At the hearing the President of the Tribunal asked directly whether the reason for adopting them had not been a “rotten compromise” and a desire to accommodate the rulings of the European courts — whether, in other words, politics had prevailed over law. The representative of the Supreme Court (Poland’s cassation court) answered that this could not be excluded.
The right of access to public service covers not only taking up an office but the real ability to exercise it
Article 60 of the Constitution provides that Polish citizens enjoying full public rights have a right of access to the public service based on the principle of equality. The Tribunal read that guarantee broadly: it would be illusory if it covered only the moment of appointment and not the conditions under which the office is actually held. The right must be real, not merely formal.
The independence test, however, makes the conditions for exercising judicial office depend on how and when a judge was appointed. That divides judges into groups of differing status, even though at any given moment there has only ever been one lawful route to the office — a citizen cannot be treated as though he could have chosen among several Presidents or several National Councils of the Judiciary. The decision to become a judge is normally a decision for life; through the test a judge is in effect punished for a decision that was entirely lawful when he took it, and was only reassessed ex post by certain authorities. The State first creates a procedure and then treats participation in it as ineffective, destroying the principle of citizens’ trust in the State and in the law it makes.
The test does not examine independence but the circumstances of appointment — and inverts the idea of recusal
The name of the institution is misleading, and the Tribunal called the matter by its name: this is a conceptual inversion. Independence is the sum of a judge’s personal qualities and of institutional guarantees, so any permissible review mechanism must rest on the relationship between the judge and the circumstances of the particular case. The contested provisions instead allow a judge to be removed from adjudicating not because of anything he did in the case, but because of circumstances over which he had no influence — he did not, after all, enact the law on the National Council of the Judiciary.
It is enough to set the wording of the provision against its declared purpose:
“It is permissible to examine whether a judge meets the requirements of independence and impartiality in the light of the circumstances surrounding his appointment and of his conduct after appointment […].”
The legislature defined neither “the circumstances surrounding the appointment,” nor “the requirements of independence,” nor “conduct after appointment.” These terms remain vague and- without any legal definition, so they fail the requirement that legal provisions be sufficiently precise — and in practice they open the way to a constitutionally impermissible review of a judicial appointment after it has been made.
The applicant’s representative restated the argument accepted earlier in case SK 68/25: judges are independent by force of Article 179 of the Constitution, and while the presumption of independence is rebuttable, it can be rebutted only by removal from office. Recusal does not touch it, since recusal concerns only the circumstances of a given case. The legislature may not, therefore, create an institution that strikes at the very basis of that presumption.
The statute does provide that excluding a judge from one case cannot ground his exclusion from the other cases he is hearing. But since the basis for exclusion lies in circumstances concerning the judge rather than the case, a judge who once fails the test will probably be assessed the same way in every subsequent proceeding — the circumstances of his appointment, being a past event, cannot change. The statutory safeguard is therefore a dead letter. Given that recusal already exists, the test becomes superfluous and so fails the constitutional criterion of necessity under Article 31(3).
The Tribunal also noted that the mechanism lengthens proceedings, which harms a party’s right to have his case heard without undue delay (Article 45(1) of the Constitution): the benefit proves smaller than the cost, so the regulation also fails the requirement of proportionality stricto sensu.
The test duplicates the procedure for removing a judge from office, and allows it to be circumvented
The status of a judge is shaped directly by the Constitution, which permits removal from office, suspension, or transfer against the judge’s will only by a court ruling and only in cases specified by statute (Article 180(2)). A statute that allows a judge’s status to be shaped in a manner close to depriving him of the ability to adjudicate is impermissible in that light, because it duplicates — and in practice circumvents — the constitutional procedure for removing a judge.
The applicant saw the problem too, as the Tribunal’s communiqué states expressly:
“[…] whether a mechanism permitting a judge to be excluded from adjudicating on the basis of abstract criteria does not lead to the creation of a category of the so-called ‘defective judge’ (one who holds the office but is deprived of the ability to adjudicate).”
A judge without investiture — a judge without jurisdiction — cannot be accepted. The test in substance creates new requirements for effectively taking up judicial office, requirements unknown to the Constitution, and violates the principle of irremovability under Article 180 by preventing a judge from adjudicating. The Tribunal invoked its settled case law, under which differentiating the status of judges by reference to the circumstances of their appointment is impermissible — as we have written on many occasions.
The chilling effect
The Tribunal further stressed that the possibility of excluding a judge because of circumstances beyond his control produces a chilling effect: a judge may hesitate to rule in an “inconvenient” way in politically sensitive cases, reckoning that he will be removed from them under the guise of an examination of his impartiality, solely because of when he took office. Paradoxically, then, it is the very existence of the “independence test” that substantially weakens independence itself — and not only for the judge who has already undergone it, but for everyone who knows he may be subjected to it. Judges thus become casualties of a political dispute that arose after their appointment, and any assessment of proportionality must take that reality into account. That the independence test is a means of making judges dependent rather than a tool for protecting their independence is something this portal has argued since the institution came into being.
The test was applied in one direction only, which exposes its political character
Throughout the life of the contested provisions the test served one purpose in practice: undermining the status of judges appointed from 2018 onward. Where judges had received their first appointment, before the democratic transition of 1989-90, from the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic — a thoroughly political body, and in a non-democratic state — analogous objections were consistently rejected.
That double standard took shape even before the test entered the statute book. When an attempt was made in December 2021 to challenge a Supreme Court judge appointed before 1989 in this way, the Supreme Court, rehearing the case in January 2022, held:
“However, in order to maintain that a judge who received his first appointment to office from the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic before 1989 is not independent, it is necessary to demonstrate in each instance a connection between his appointment procedure and an actual influence on the outcome of the particular case.”
A general, abstract assessment was then held to be unlawful and therefore impermissible. It would be hard to find a better illustration of the problem: the requirement to show a connection between the circumstances of appointment and the particular case — rightly imposed there — in practice disappeared where judges appointed from 2018 onward were concerned, since the mere fact of appointment on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary as constituted after 2017 sufficed. An institution conceived as a tool of compromise with the European institutions turned out to be a tool of political selection, which settles the question of its complete failure — quite apart from today’s judgment.
Worse still is the practice of excluding judges solely because of the circumstances of their appointment directly under the general provisions on recusal and under the Supreme Court’s so-called “two-and-a-half chambers” resolution of January 23, 2020 — bypassing even the modest guarantees the test provided. The Tribunal has repeatedly held that practice impermissible, most recently in its judgment of November 25, 2025 (P 7/23), as we reported; it had already found the resolution of January 23, 2020 itself unconstitutional in April 2020. The judgment in K 21/26 thus completes that line of case law.
Conclusion
The judgment in K 21/26 follows in large part from the ruling of February 25, 2026 (SK 68/25), in which the Tribunal removed the equivalent provision on the administrative courts on identical grounds of review. After today’s decision, not a single provision allowing an independence test to be conducted remains in force in Polish law — not in the administrative courts, nor in the common courts, the military courts or the Supreme Court.
The Tribunal made clear that the rulings of the European courts, so readily invoked by the test’s supporters, did not analyze the individual rights of a judge at all: they decided on the procedural guarantees owed to the parties, not on the constitutional status of a person appointed by the President — as was plainly visible in the ambiguous CJEU judgment in case C-521/21.
The judgment is final and of universally binding application (Article 190(1) of the Constitution). The contested provisions have ceased to have effect, so applications for a test have become devoid of purpose and the proceedings concerning them are to be discontinued. Any further removal of judges from adjudicating on the basis of the repealed provisions will be action without a legal basis — with all that this entails, from disciplinary liability, through liability under Article 231 of the Criminal Code, to claims for damages against the State Treasury.
The question remains whether the government will publish the judgment and whether the courts will apply it. The experience of recent years, with the government of Donald Tusk still withholding the publication of over a hundred rulings issued by the country’s constitutional court since April 2024, offers little ground for hope, the more so as further bills targeting judges appointed after 2018 are pending in the Sejm, Poland’s lower house of parliament. The point, however, is that — as the Tribunal has itself previously ruled — the legal effects of its judgments cannot depend either on an editorial decision of the Prime Minister’s Chancellery or on whether anyone finds their content congenial. The courts, subject above all to the Constitution, should therefore comply with its rulings from the moment they are delivered.
Source of cover photo: iStock.


