Judges Removed by Act of Parliament: Poland’s Ruling Majority Defies Its Own Constitution

  • On October 22, 2026, the Sejm, Poland’s lower house of parliament, passed a law which—without any court judgment—returns judges appointed since 2018 to their previous posts or strips them of judicial office altogether.
  • The law flagrantly violates Article 180 of the Polish Constitution, which permits the removal of a judge from office or their transfer to another position against their will only by virtue of a court judgment; it also breaches, among others, Articles 2, 32, 45 and 179 of the Constitution.
  • The most glaring flaw is the law’s scope, which covers judges appointed on the basis of resolutions adopted by Poland’s National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) between March 7, 2018, and May 15, 2026. Yet the new NCJ, in office since May 16, was elected under exactly the same rules as the councils chosen in 2018 and 2022.

Since March 2018—when the method of selecting the judicial members of the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), the body whose motion is required in Poland for the appointment of judges, was changed from election by judges themselves to election by the Sejm—a dispute has persisted over the way the NCJ is constituted. Although the Polish Constitution does not specify who is to elect the judicial members of the NCJ, the then-opposition, which now forms the governing majority, has challenged the status of the NCJ and of the judges appointed on its motion. Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, however, held in its judgment of March 25, 2019 (ref. K 12/18) that the new procedure is consistent with the Constitution.

At the same time, the then-opposition sought to draw the institutions of the European Union into the dispute, even though the organization of the judiciary falls within the competence of the Member States. As early as December 2017, the European Commission triggered the Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland and subsequently brought the country before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which—going beyond the competences conferred on it by the Treaties—took it upon itself to assess the status of Polish judges. Such interference, in breach of Poland’s sovereignty, has been repeatedly rejected by Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, notably in its judgment of October 7, 2021 (ref. K 3/21) and, most recently, in its judgment of September 10, 2026 (ref. P 10/24), which held that the EU Treaties cannot be read as empowering the CJEU to assess Poland’s judicial appointment procedure.

Surprisingly, however, the ruling majority has since changed its mind on this point: in May 2026, it elected the new NCJ in exactly the same manner and under the same statute—by a vote of the Sejm. Despite this fact, the Sejm has now passed a law that undermines the status of the two previous NCJs and of the judges appointed on their motion.

On October 22, 2026, the Sejm passed the Act on restoring the right to an independent and impartial court established by law by regulating the effects of resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary adopted in 2018–2026 (Sejm print no. 2107). The bill was supported by 231 deputies—almost all of them from the ruling coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk—with 200 voting against. The adopted text will now be considered by the Senate, the upper house of the Polish parliament, after which it will go to the President for signature.

As we explained in detail as early as last year, the bill is unconstitutional at its very core, a point we also made during the public hearing in the Sejm in February 2026. The bill has also drawn wide criticism from others, including the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, a liberal human rights organization founded in 1989 that was among the most vocal critics of the judicial reforms adopted after 2015 and holds very different views from ours on many issues. It also runs counter to the urgent opinion of the Venice Commission of February 2026, which stressed that “decisions on the transfer or removal of judges should not fall within the competence of Parliament.”

After the public hearing, nearly six months of silence followed, and one could have hoped that the project had been abandoned. That, however, did not happen.

The law directly violates Article 180 of the Constitution

The essence of the law lies in its Article 2(1), which by operation of statute deprives of legal effect the NCJ resolutions recommending candidates for appointment as judges. The consequences of this premise are spelled out in Articles 3 and 5, under which judges who, before their appointment to their current posts, served in a lower-level court return to the positions they previously held. Judges who entered the judiciary from other legal professions, in turn, lose their office on the day the law enters into force.

Both of these solutions are, of course, in direct conflict with Article 180 of the Constitution, which unequivocally provides:

1. Judges shall not be removable.

2. Recall of a judge from office, suspension from office, transfer to another bench or position against his will, may only occur by virtue of a court judgment and only in those instances prescribed in statute.

The law replaces a court judgment with an announcement by the Minister of Justice in the official gazette Monitor Polski (Article 14), which cannot be challenged before an administrative court. Moreover, an appeal to the Supreme Court—which must be lodged within two weeks, with no possibility of reinstating the deadline—does not suspend the effects of the law (Article 15).

Violation of the President’s prerogative and of legal certainty

This, however, is not the only unconstitutional idea contained in the law. In Articles 42–44 and Article 46(10), it imposes on the President a three-month deadline for appointing judges, counted from the submission of the NCJ’s motion. Yet an analogous solution has already been held incompatible with Article 179 and Article 2 of the Constitution in the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of June 5, 2012 (ref. K 18/09). In that judgment, the Tribunal struck down the one-month deadline for appointing judges then provided for in Article 55 § 1 of the Law on the System of Common Courts—the very provision in which Article 43 of the adopted law now introduces a three-month deadline. In the reasoning of the judgment, the Tribunal also stated that:

[…] the role of the President in the appointment procedure is not confined merely to that of a “notary” confirming decisions taken elsewhere […]; rather, he carries out an independent assessment of the candidates presented to him and may consequently refuse to grant the NCJ’s motion. He must be granted the right to refuse to comply with the motions submitted if, in his view, they would run counter to the values the Constitution has entrusted him to safeguard […].

And yet the statutory deadline is meant to reduce the President precisely to the role of a notary—and this at a time when he will have to consider the new NCJ’s motions to fill all the posts vacated by operation of the law!

In Articles 33–36 and Article 39, the law also allows final judgments issued by the judges it covers to be set aside, which raises obvious concerns in light of the principle of the stability of legal relations (derived from Article 2 of the Constitution). Moreover, the conditions for setting judgments aside are framed in a highly questionable manner, drawing an unjustified distinction between judgments of the common, military and voivodeship administrative courts—which, as a rule, may be set aside only if the composition of the court was challenged earlier or a complaint was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)—and judgments of the Supreme Court and Poland’s Supreme Administrative Court (NSA), which are set aside at the mere request of a party.

Same provisions, different consequences—the absurd narrowing of Article 1

The most glaring evidence of the purely political intentions of a legislature that disregards the requirements of the Constitution, however, is Article 1 of the law. According to the original government draft, its scope was to cover:

resolutions adopted in 2018–2025 in individual cases by the National Council of the Judiciary, constituted on the basis of the Act of December 8, 2017, amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2018, item 3).

The catch is that the NCJ elected by the current ruling majority in May 2026 was chosen—just like the two previous ones—on the basis of precisely the same provisions, which have been in force since 2018. In an attempt to circumvent this undeniable fact, Article 1 of the law passed by the Sejm reads:

This Act regulates the effects of resolutions adopted in individual cases by the National Council of the Judiciary in the period from March 7, 2018, to May 15, 2026.

Did the legal framework governing the election of the NCJ change in any way on May 16, 2026? Not in the least! The sole purpose of adopting this particular provision is therefore to differentiate between judges appointed on the motion of the NCJ elected in 2026 and those appointed on the motion of the two previous councils—without any legal basis whatsoever! Such differentiation of identical legal situations is manifestly contrary to the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 32 of the Constitution and cannot be acceptable in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

Summary

The law is now before the Senate. As shown above, however, its very essence is so blatantly contrary to numerous provisions of the Constitution (in particular Articles 32, 179 and 180) that it cannot be remedied by any amendments. The Senate should therefore reject it in its entirety, although this is hardly to be expected, given that the current coalition holds a majority there. In that case, a veto by President Karol Nawrocki will be necessary—and it will most likely follow, as the President has repeatedly declared that he will not accept any undermining of the status of judges appointed in accordance with the Constitution or of his prerogatives.

All the objections already raised by us and other organizations during the public hearing in the Sejm therefore remain valid, especially since none of them has received a substantive response from the government or the majority supporting it.

In light of the above, it must be emphasized once again that a law that removes judges from office without a court judgment—openly violating Article 180 of the Constitution and constituting an unprecedented assault on the independence of the judiciary and of judges—cannot enter into force—and we are confident that it will not. The work on it must therefore be regarded as an exceptionally unproductive waste of the time of deputies, senators and, ultimately, the President himself, who will fortunately have the final say in this matter. Yet if the government genuinely cared about the rule of law, such a deeply flawed bill would never have reached the President’s desk and would not be taking up his attention, which could be devoted to matters of real importance for the common good.

Image source: iStock.

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