This post contains an excerpt from the report “A year of devastation of the rule of law”, published by the Ordo Iuris Institute on 13 December. The full report is available at https://https://en.ordoiuris.pl/civil-liberties/year-of-devastation-of-rule-of-law-in-poland
Main theses
- In the fall of 2015, the Seventh Sejm elected five judges to the Constitutional Tribunal (out of a total of 15) for terms that were likely to begin during the next term of the Sejm.
- In the case of two of these Judges, the Constitutional Tribunal explicitly stated that the legal basis for their election was unconstitutional.
- The current government’s position is that the remaining three of these judges were duly elected, and therefore it is the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal formed by the Eighth Sejm that was flawed, as it included people elected to positions that had previously been filled.
- As of December 2023, the current government has been publishing CT verdicts with a notation about the participation of unauthorized persons in the panel. These annotations are made without a legal basis.
- In March 2024, the Sejm passed a resolution on removing the effects of the constitutional crisis of 2015-2023 in the context of the Constitutional Tribunal’s activities, which questioned the effectiveness of all CT activities. From the time of its adoption, the government, in violation of the Constitution, ceased to publish CT rulings in the OJ at all, regardless of the composition of the court that ruled on the case,
- Also in March 2024, the government presented a package of laws providing, among other things, for the annulment of some 100 judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal and the expiration of the terms of office of all Constitutional Tribunal judges. However, these solutions have been strongly criticized by, among others, the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights and the Venice Commission.
The genesis of the dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal
The beginning of the crisis around the Constitutional Tribunal, which continues to this day, dates back to 2015, when the law on the Constitutional Tribunal dated June 25, 2015 was passed[1]. Article 137 of that law provided a special legal basis for electing successors to replace judges whose terms expired in 2015. Significantly, the terms of all the newly elected judges were to begin after the expiration of the four-year term of the Seventh-term Sejm (in which the Civic Platform-Polish People’s Party coalition had a majority), counting from November 8, 2011, when the President of Poland convened its first session. The terms of office of three newly elected judges were to begin on November 7, 2015[2], which is exactly the first day after expiration of the term of the Sejm. The terms of the next two judges, meanwhile, were to begin on December 3 and 9, respectively[3].
However, it should be borne in mind that according to Article 98(1) of the Constitution, the term of office of the Sejm may be extended beyond the strictly understood four years, since it ends only on the day before the next Sejm convenes for its first session. In turn, according to Article 109(2) of the Constitution, the First Session of the Sejm shall be convened by the President of the Republic within 30 days from the date of elections, and, according to the prevailing doctrinal position, it may not be convened earlier than after expiration of the four-year term of the previous Sejm. At the time of electing the five new Constitutional Tribunal judges, it was known that the terms of two of them would certainly begin more than 30 days after the elections, which the President had set for October 25, 2015.[4]
Finally, the Eighth Sejm (in which the Law and Justice-led United Right coalition had an absolute majority) convened for its first session on November 12, 2015.[5] Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 2015, the Sejm passed five resolutions declaring the earlier resolutions on the election of Constitutional Tribunal judges to be of no legal force[6]. In each of the resolutions adopted by the Sejm, it was written that “the Sejm of the Republic of Poland requests the President to refrain from taking the oath of office from the person named in the subject resolution.” On December 2, 2015, the Sejm elected five candidates as judges of the Constitutional Tribunal[7], and on the following day the President of the Republic of Poland took the oath of office from four of these candidates.
On the same day, the Constitutional Tribunal issued a judgment[8], in which it found that Article 137 of the 2015 Law on the Constitutional Tribunal complies with the Constitution with regard to judges of the Tribunal whose terms expired on November 6, 2015, while at the same time being inconsistent with the Polish Constitution insofar as it applies to judges whose terms was to expire on December 2 and December 8, 2015, respectively. The Constitutional Tribunal based its reasoning on the position that “it follows from Article 194(1) of the Constitution that a Tribunal judge should be elected by the Sejm of the term during which the position of a Tribunal judge was vacated.” The Constitutional Tribunal stressed that “the election of a Tribunal judge cannot be made, as it were, in advance (ahead of time) in relation to judicial positions that will only be vacated during the term of the future Sejm. Bringing things ad absurdum, the mechanism provided for in Article 137 of the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal could be used not only for Tribunal judges whose terms expired in 2015, but also for those positions that will be vacated in subsequent years. This would set a dangerous precedent.”
In the end, however, both the President and the eighth-term Sejm, even after the CT ruling of December 3, 2015, stood by the position expressed in the resolutions of November 25, according to which all appointments of judges to the CT by the Sejm in October on the basis of Article 137 of the then law on the CT are invalid. The President did not take the oath from any of these judges, and consequently they have not been allowed to rule.
Announcement of the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgments in the OJ with a note that its composition does not comply with Article 6 of the ECHR
The dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal entered a new phase after the October 15, 2023 elections, especially after the December 13 formation of Donald Tusk’s government. The Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings, which were issued with the participation of judges appointed for terms beginning November 7, 2015, were published from December 18, 2023, in the OJ with the notation “In accordance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases: Xero Flor in Poland Sp. z o.o. p. Poland dated 7.05.2021, complaint no. 4907/18; Walesa p. Poland dated 23.11.2023, complaint no. 50849/21; M.L. p. Poland dated 14.12.2023, Complaint No. 40119/21, the Constitutional Tribunal is deprived of the characteristics of a tribunal established by law when an unauthorized person sits in its composition. According to these rulings, the published judgment was issued in a composition established in violation of the basic principle applicable to the election of Constitutional Tribunal judges and consequently violating the essence of the right to a court established by law.”
It is necessary to emphasize that there exists a law on the promulgation of normative acts and certain other legal acts[9], which determines the rules and procedure for the promulgation of such acts. The law does not authorize the authority issuing the official journal to make any adnotations. There is no legal basis for such activity on the part of the government, which thereby violates the principle of adherence to the law, as stated in Article 7 of the Constitution. In view of the above, it should be considered that the placement of the annotation has no legal effect.
Thus, since there has been an announcement of the judgment in question in the official publication, in accordance with Article 190 of the Constitution, the judgment entered into force on the date of its announcement and acquired the force of general application and attribute of finality. The government’s undermining of these effects causes chaos from which citizens suffer the most.
It is unprecedented for the executive branch to indicate which Constitutional Tribunal judgments should be taken into account by the courts. Such behaviour should be unequivocally assessed negatively, and should even be considered an attempt by the executive branch to exert pressure on the judiciary, which contradicts the principle of a tripartite division of power expressed in the Polish Constitution.
Sejm resolution challenging the status of Constitutional Tribunal judges
On March 6, 2024, the Tenth Sejm passed a resolution on removing the effects of the constitutional crisis of 2015-2023 in the context of the Constitutional Tribunal’s activities[10]. The current Sejm stated that the resolutions of the 8th Sejm – respectively, regarding the annulment of the resolutions of the 7th Sejm on the election of Constitutional Tribunal judges, as well as the election of Constitutional Tribunal judges in place of those previously elected, were adopted “in flagrant violation of the law, including the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and thus are devoid of legal force and have not produced the legal effects envisaged therein.” With this in mind, the Polish Sejm stated that “consideration in the actions of a public authority of Constitutional Tribunal resolution issued in violation of the law can be considered a violation of the principle of adherence to the law by the authority.”
In the subject resolution, the Sejm also stated that Constitutional Tribunal President Julia Przyłębska was defectively elected, and even if one accepts that fact of her appointment, the her six-year term expired on December 21, 2022. Moreover, the Sejm approved the questioning of the Constitutional Tribunal President’s decisions, pointing out that: “As a result, all procedural decisions in directing the work of the Constitutional Tribunal, especially the appointment of adjudicating panels, by Julia Przyłębska may be questioned.” In addition, the Sejm expressed the view that the scale of violations of the existing law “makes it impossible for this body to carry out its systemic tasks of controlling the constitutionality of the law, including for the protection of human and civil rights.” Such a situation, in the Sejm’s view, requires “the re-creation of a constitutional court, in accordance with constitutional principles and taking into account the voice of all political forces that respect the constitutional order.” In turn, with regard to constitutional court judges, the Sejm made an appeal for them to resign from their posts and “join the process of democratic transition.”
The above resolution, of course, has no legal effect. The Sejm does not have the authority to shorten or extinguish the term of office of a judge sitting on the Constitutional, nor to review the election of a previously elected judge, as long as the elected person has taken office. Nor does the Sejm have the power to annul a constitutional court ruling.
The resolution passed by the Sejm should therefore be considered only a political statement. Despite this, it should not be passed over indifferently, as it may pose a significant threat to the legal order in Poland, especially in the aspect in which it calls on other bodies to violate the Constitution by ignoring judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal, despite their final and universally binding nature. This may also be another manifestation of the current government’s violation of the guarantee of judicial independence by attempting to influence the adjudication of cases.
What is particularly reprehensible, however, is that after the adoption of the resolution, the government stopped publishing CT judgments at all, regardless of whether judges on the bench were judges whose circumstances of appointment were questioned by the current governing coalition or not.[11]. Despite appeals by the CT President to representatives of the Government Legislation Center,[12] this state of affairs persists to this day (December 2024). However, this does not undermine the effectiveness of judgements, as they are binding from the time of issue, i.e. when announced in the courtroom. The CT also expressed this position in a March 9, 2016 judgment[13], incidentally issued during a period of fierce dispute between the CT and the then-government over, among other things, the non-publication of CT judgments.
Government bills on the Constitutional Tribunal
On March 4, 2024, the Justice Ministry presented a so-called package of solutions to heal the Constitutional Tribunal[14] comprising:
draft law – Introductory Provisions to the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal – formally submitted by a group of deputies (parliamentary print no. 254)[15];
Draft of a new law on the Constitutional Tribunal – formally submitted by a group of deputies (parliamentary print No. 253) [16];
Bill to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Poland – in practice submitted by a group of Senators (Senate print no. 55)[17].
Both parliamentary bills were passed as laws by the Sejm on September 13, 2024. However, the President referred them to the Constitutional Tribunal on October 7 for preventive control[18]. The Tribunal was initially scheduled to hear them both together under the joint reference number Kp 3/24 on December 9[19], but the case was taken off the docket at the last minute.
Draft law – Provisions introducing the law on the Constitutional Tribunal
The essence of this draft is:
The annulment of approximately 100 Constitutional Tribunal rulings issued by benches with judges elected for terms that began on November 7, 2015.
Recognizing as null and void the appointments to the positions of President of the Constitutional Tribunal (this function at the time of both submission and adoption of the law was held by Julia Przyłębska, whose term expired on December 9, 2024) and Vice President of the Constitutional Tribunal (this position is currently vacant, but on July 21, 2023 the General Assembly of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal passed a resolution to submit the candidacies of Bartłomiej Sochański and Jakub Stelina to the President of the Republic of Poland, which had not yet been considered at the end of 2024).
Expiry of the employment of employees of the reorganized Chancellery of the Tribunal, except of those discretionarily designated by its Head.
The draft has been criticized by, among others, the Commissioner for Human Rights[20], the Office of Studies and Analyses of the Supreme Court[21], as well as by some experts such as Dr. Marcin Szwed of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights[22].
The Commissioner for Human Rights strongly criticized the statutory annulment of judgments involving unauthorized persons. In the opinion of the CHR, statutory nullification or declaration of non-existence of judgments or a group of judgments of courts or tribunals is excluded as contradictory to the principle of finality of judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal (Article 190(1) of the Constitution), the principle of adherence to the law (Article 7 of the Constitution), the principle of separation and independence of the judiciary from the legislature (Articles 10 and 173 of the Constitution), and principles derived from the principle of the rule of law of the security of legal transactions, trust of the citizen in the state and non-retroactivity of the law (Article 2 of the Constitution).
In the view of the Commissioner for Human Rights, recognition that in certain circumstances parliament is allowed to single out a group of Constitutional Tribunal judgments and declare that they are not “rulings” within the meaning of the Constitution will create a dangerous precedent for the future, which can be used in other circumstances by a current political majority at the time.
According to the CHR, the optimal solution, also constitutionally permissible, would be to allow the Constitutional Tribunal itself – acting in its correct composition – to resume proceedings in cases decided by incorrect compositions of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Dr. Marcin Szwed, on the other hand, additionally argued that the draft does not specify the consequences of “the ’annulment’ of Constitutional Tribunal judgments (without at least determining whether this will lead to the resurrection of repealed regulations),” which “poses a threat to legal certainty.”[23]
In turn, Article 11(1) of the draft provides for the assumption of the duties of President of the Constitutional Tribunal by the Constitutional Tribunal judge with the longest tenure at the Tribunal on the date of entry of the law into force (paragraph 1), and for the appointment of the new Constitutional Tribunal President and new Constitutional Tribunal Deputy President within 6 months of the entry of the law into force (paragraph 2). The Supreme Court’s Office of Studies and Analyses points out that this solution will have the effect of challenging the chairmanship of Julia Przyłębska’s successor (Bogdan Święczkowski, elected to the post on December 9, 2024), even if he was appointed in full compliance with the law. The same applies to the selection for the currently vacant position of CT Deputy President. According to the CHR, declaring appointments to the positions of President and Deputy President of the Constitutional Tribunal as null and void will be a clear violation of the principle of adherence to the law (Article 7 of the Constitution) and the competence of the General Assembly of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal and the President of the Republic to fill these positions (Article 194(2) of the Constitution). The Supreme Court’s Office of Studies and Analyses additionally points out the incompatibility of this solution with the principle of separation and independence of the judiciary (Article 173 of the Constitution).
The proposal to statutorily extinguish employment of all employees of the Tribunal’s clerical staff, i.e., Chancellery of the Constitutional Tribunal and Office of the Legal Service of the Constitutional Tribunal, was also met with a negative assessment by the CHR, the Supreme Court’s Office of Studies and Analyses and Dr. Szwed. According to the CHR, such a solution is incompatible with the principle of labor protection (Article 24 of the Constitution) and the right of citizens to access the public service on equal terms (Article 60 of the Constitution). The Commissioner for Human Rights stresses that, in principle, the reorganization of staff of a state office is not excluded, but it must be based on the assumption that the value of each employee should be assessed individually and on the basis of precise criteria, with adequate guarantees of appeal to courts. The incompatibility of this solution with Article 24 and Article 60 of the Constitution is also pointed out by the Office of Studies and Analysis of the Supreme Court and Dr. Szwed of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. According to the Supreme Court’s Office of Studies and Analysis , the subject proposal “violates numerous standards (including international standards) of legal protection due to employees and elementary principles of social intercourse.” In turn, Dr. Szwed points out that “the drafters have not presented any convincing arguments to justify the introduction of such unfavourable solutions for employees.”
Draft of the new law on the CT
Unlike the draft of the introductory regulations, the draft of the new CT law itself did not raise fundamental objections. Critical comments – made, among others, by the CHR[24], the national chamber of legal advisers (KIRP)[25] and expert-authors of opinions commissioned by the parliamentary Office of Expertise and Regulatory Impact Assessment[26] – mainly concerned details, although some of them are significant.
The Commissioner for Human Rights notes that the draft requires some amendments, as some of its provisions contain loopholes, some are questionable from the standpoint of compliance with the Constitution, and some repeat previous solutions, without taking into account the systemic experience of the Tribunal’s functioning in 2015-2024 (such as the refusal to take the oath from Constitutional Tribunal judges, withholding of the publication of Constitutional Tribunal judgments, or abuse of the institution of protective orders).
The Commissioner for Human Rights also expresses doubts about the advisability of maintaining the requirement for CT judges to take an oath to the President of the Republic. The Polish Constitution does not require that a CT judge elected by the Sejm take an oath before anybody and even less so that the establishment of an official relationship and a judge’s assumption of office depend on this action. From the standpoint of Article 194(1) of the Constitution, a resolution of the Sejm is sufficient for the effective election of a CT judge. Introducing another step in the electoral procedure at the level of the law and granting a competence to a state body other than the Sejm that may result in blocking a CT judge from taking office would be inconsistent with the indicated constitutional provision.
According to the CHR, the draft also unnecessarily grants the Prosecutor General and President of the Republic of Poland the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Constitutional Tribunal judges, pointing out that a similar solution was deemed incompatible with the principle of the independence of Constitutional Tribunal judges (Article 195(1) of the Constitution) in the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of March 9, 2016, K 47/15.
The Commissioner for Human Rights also criticized the extension of preliminary control to legal questions from courts and requests from public authorities such as the First President of the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Prosecutor General, the National Council of the Judiciary, the President of the Supreme Audit Office or the CHR. As a result, a single-judge bench of the Tribunal would be able to declare a legal question or application “manifestly unfounded” without in-depth analysis and without referring it to an enlarged panel. In the CHR’s view, such entities should enjoy, as is the case in the current legal state, a type of “presumption of professionalism.”
Bill to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Poland
The essence of the bill to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is to extinguish the term of office of all current Constitutional Tribunal judges and for the Sejm to elect new judges in one of two modes: by a 3/5 majority, or, if unsuccessful, by an absolute majority (Articles 2 and 3 of the bill). The bill is still at the first reading stage in the Senate, and work on it last took place on July 23.
It seems that the solution it proposes, which is to resolve the dispute over the CT by amending the Constitution, would merit acceptance from the standpoint of the rule of law. On the other hand, however, the First President of the Supreme Court expressed doubt that the transitional provisions of the law on constitutional amendment can provide, as the draft provides, a stand-alone basis for expiration of the term of office of CT judges and the election of their successors[27]. She also rightly pointed out that the draft treats those judges whose election to the Constitutional Tribunal is not questioned by anyone in any way the same way as for the few questioned judges.The vast majority of judges whose terms would be shortened belong to the first group. Finally, the President of the Supreme Court raised that the election of all 15 judges at the same time would be an unprecedented situation in the history of the Polish Third Republic.
Position of the Venice Commission
At its 141st plenary session on December 6 and 7, 2024, the Venice Commission adopted an opinion on the Polish government’s proposed amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal[28]. First of all, the Venice Commission said that it would be unacceptable to extinguish the term of office of all CT judges as violating guarantees of judicial non-removability.
In addition, the Commission took the position that all judgments issued by the CT since March, 2024 should be published by the government. At the same time, the Commission found acceptable the practice of placing annotations next to sentences, as mentioned above. The opinion of the Venice Commission in this regard (as well as analogous opinions issued with regard to the National Council of the Judiciary[29]) are not legally binding.
Summary
The current governing camp in Poland is not only responsible for creating the crisis around the Constitutional Tribunal by electing two of its judges in the fall of 2015 in a manner clearly contrary to the Constitution and attempting to elect three more in a manner contrary, if not to the Constitution, then certainly to good parliamentary practice, but also for its significant deepening of the crisis after it took power again in December 2023. A number of its actions, led by the placing of annotations next to judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal or the cessation of their publication altogether as of March 2024, are characterized by a lack of any legal basis, thus making them likely to be considered a serious constitutional tort.
Particularly worthy of condemnation is the decision to halt the publication of any Constitutional Tribunal rulings. Due to the binding nature of the mere promulgation of Constitutional Tribunal judgments, this should not in theory prevent citizens from asserting their constitutional rights and freedoms. Yet, in practice, this undoubtedly reduces the level of legal certainty in which citizens evolve.
As in the case of the National Council of the Judiciary, the government’s proposed radical statutory measures, such as declaring legally null and void all CT verdicts issued by judges whose status the government questions or extinguishing the terms of office of all CT members, are also questionable under European rule-of-law standards. It is highly telling that the government, which emphasizes values such as judicial independence and the tripartite division of power, also in this aspect proposes solutions based on legislative actions without respect for the right to a court.
This peculiar hypocrisy of the Tusk government also manifests itself in exactly the same actions being taken for which its members most fiercely criticized their predecessors. The most blatant manifestation of this is the failure to publish Constitutional Tribunal judgments, which is exactly the same action, albeit at a much larger scale, as that alleged against the ruling camp during the Eighth Sejm.
It can also be considered particularly telling that, in seeking to enact appointments to the CT before the 2015 elections, the then-Sejm majority as the main reason cited the desire to preserve the continuity of CT work with a 15-member composition, which would be impossible in the event of the election of the five judges in question by the next Sejm. Meanwhile, when the nine-year terms of three disputed CT judges elected by the eighth-term Sejm ended in early December, 2024, the current parliamentary majority declared that it did not intend to put forward candidates for the vacant positions[30]. Thus, one gets the impression that the dispute is by no means about the efficiency of the Tribunal’s work, and perhaps never was.
Jedrzej Jablonski, Magdalena Lis
[1] OJ 2015, item 1064.
[2] See Resolutions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of October 8, 2015 on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. 2015 item 1038, 1039 and 1040.
[3] See Resolutions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of October 8, 2015 on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P.. 2015 item 1041 and 1042.
[4] Decision of the President of the Republic of Poland of July 17, 2015 on ordering elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to the Senate of the Republic of Poland, OJ 2015, item 1017.
[5] First sessions of the Sejm and Senate on November 12, November 05, 2015, https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/pierwsze-posiedzenia-sejmu-i-senatu-12-listopada,52, accessed December 5, 2024.
[6] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of November 25, 2015 on declaring invalid a resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of October 8, 2015 on the election of a Constitutional Tribunal judge published in Monitor Polski of October 23, 2015, item 1038-1042, M.P. of 2015, item 1131-1135.
[7] Resolutions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of December 2, 2015 on the election of a Constitutional Tribunal judge, M.P. of 2015, item 1182-1186.
[8] Ref. K 34/15, OTK ZU 11A/2015, item 185, https://ipo.trybunal.gov.pl/ipo/Sprawa?&pokaz=dokumenty&sygnatura=K 34/15, accessed 5.12.2024.
[9] Act of July 20, 2000 on promulgation of normative acts and certain other legal acts (Dz. U. of 2019, item 1461).
[10] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of March 6, 2024 on removing the effects of the constitutional crisis of 2015-2023 in the context of the activities of the Constitutional Tribunal (M.P. of 2024, item 198).
[11] Grzegorz Sroczynski, A “non-existent” judge, but an “existing” ruling. How the government is deepening the chaos in courts [Sroczynski Interviews], 09. October 2024, https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,31369638,sedzia-nieistniejacy-ale-wyrok-istniejacy-jak-rzad-poglebia.html accessed December 9, 2024.
[12] The government does not publish CT rulings. “Violation of the Polish Constitution”, August 21, 2024, https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/624720/przylebska-napisala-do-knapinskiej-czemu-rzad-nie-publikuje-wyrokow-tk.html, accessed December 9, 2024.
[13] Ref. K 47/15, OTK ZU A/2018, pos. 31
[14] Ministry of Justice press release: https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/pakiet-rozwiazan-uzdrawiajacych-trybunal-konstytucyjny, accessed May 8, 2024.
[15] https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm10.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=254, accessed December 9, 2024.
[16] https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm10.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=253, accessed December 9, 2024.
[17] https://www.senat.gov.pl/prace/proces-legislacyjny-w-senacie/inicjatywy-ustawodawcze/inicjatywa,243.html, accessed December 9, 2024.
[18] Two laws to the CT under the preventive control procedure, October 7, 2024. https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/dwa-wnioski-do-tk-w-trybie-kontroli-prewencyjnej,92504, accessed December 9, 2024.
[19] Communiqué: Law on the Constitutional Tribunal, Kp 3/24, https://trybunal.gov.pl/postepowanie-i-orzeczenia/komunikaty-prasowe/komunikaty-przed/art/ustawa-o-trybunale-konstytucyjnym-2, accessed December 9, 2024.
[20] Opinion of the CHR on the draft law – introductory provisions of the law on the Constitutional Tribunal (parliamentary print no. 254, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/202404/Do_Sejmu_TK_projekt_opinia_22_04_2024.pdf (accessed: May 8, 2024).
[21] Opinion of the Supreme Court’s Office of Studies and Analysis on the parliamentary draft law – Introduction of the Constitutional Tribunal Act, https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki10ka.nsf/0/C27826D353DAB67CC1258B0A00538E4A/$File/254-007.pdf (accessed: May 8, 2024).
[22] Opinion of M. Szwed on the constitutionality of the parliamentary draft law introducing the Constitutional Tribunal Act (print no. 254), as commissioned by the Bureau of Expertise and Regulatory Impact Assessment of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/rexdomk10.nsf/0/4B2B203E05CCF039C1258AEB0036BE3E/$File/i659-24A_MS.pdf (accessed: May 8, 2024).
[23] CHR Opinion, op. cit. p. 18.
[24] Opinion of the CHR on the parliamentary draft law on the Constitutional Tribunal (parliamentary print no. 253), https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/2024-04/Do_Sejmu_TK_ustawa_projekt_opinia_25_04_2024.pdf (accessed: May 8, 2024), on: CHR Opinion (2)
[25] Opinion of the Center for Research, Studies and Legislation of the National Council of Legal Advisers on the parliamentary draft law on the Constitutional Tribunal, https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki10ka.nsf/0/D861FE8A99ADB0D0C1258B010039E4B1/$File/253-001.pdf (accessed: May 8, 2024).
[26] See list: https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm10.nsf/opinieBEOS.xsp?nr=253 (accessed: May 8, 2024).
[27] Opinion on the draft Warsaw law on amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Senate print no. 55), May 16, 2024 mark: BSA III.021.12.2024. https://www.senat.gov.pl/download/gfx/senat/pl/senatinicjatywypliki/2124/4/055_sn.pdf accessed
December 9, 2024. .
[28] As of December 2014, the opinion had not been published, but its main theses, however, had been cited in media reports – see, for example, “The opinion of the Venice Commission on the Constitutional Tribunal. There is an opinion of the Venice Commission on the Constitutional Tribunal. “Unacceptable”, Polish Press Agency, December 6, 2024, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/komisja-wenecka-donald-tusk-powinien-publikowac-wyroki-trybunaly-konstytucyjnego/jx7jb1k accessed December 9, 2024.
[29] See the section on the National Council of the Judiciary.
[30] There will be an additional deadline for submitting candidates to the CT. “That the formalities be completed”, November 19, 2024, https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Bedzie-dodatkowy-termin-na-zglaszanie-kandydatow-do-TK-Zeby-formalnosci-zostaly-dopelnione-8847578.html, accessed December 9, 2024.
